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PROPERTY
W. Lee Hargrave*

ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION OF UNDEVELOPED OR ABANDONED

STREETS

Two courts of appeal, the first and fourth circuits, recently concluded
that land that is owned by local governments and that is intended to
be developed into streets or alleys cannot be acquired by private persons
through acquisitive prescription.' This view appears to be contrary to
that adopted by the the second and third circuits.2 The general principle
involved is that public things are insusceptible of private ownership and
thus not subject to acquisition by prescription.' The specific problem
at hand is whether land owned by local government units that is not
used as a street, but which is or was planned to become a street is a
4
public or a private thing.
The Cases
In the four cases discussed below, adjacent landowners had possessed
small, disputed areas contiguous to their larger lots and were trying to
consolidate their interests.
The second circuit in the 1943 case of Louisiana Highway Commission v. Raxsdale,5 dealt with a narrow triangular plot of land sold
to a municipality, the act stating the land was "purchased as a street
of said town of Alexandria." ' 6 However, "the lot never formed any part
of a street or highway or other public place in the city and likewise in
7
no other manner did the city use or dedicate it to public purposes.,"

Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. City of Covington v. Glockner, 486 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
488 So. 2d 693 (1986); Schmit v. St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, 504 So. 2d 619 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1987).
2. La. Highway Comm'n v. Raxsdale, 12 So. 2d 631 (La..App. 2d Cir. 1943); City
of New Iberia v. Romero, 391 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
3. La. Civ. Code arts. 449 and 450. La. Civ. Code art. 3485 provides: "All private
things are susceptible of prescription unless prescription is excluded by legislation."

The

leading case is City of New Orleans v. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co., 135 La. 828, 66
So. 237 (1914). See A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 33 at 92, § 34 at 95, § 40 at 103, in
2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980).
4. Land owned by the state, a levee board or a school district is treated differently.
It cannot be acquired by prescription even if a private thing. See text at note 23.
5. • 12 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943).
6. Id.at 633.
7. Id.
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The court held that the property was subject to prescription, emphasizing
the lack of public use.
In 1980, the third circuit decided City of New Iberia v. Romero.'
The city's rights were not acquired by an act of sale, but as a result
of landowners executing in 1903 an instrument to "grant, donate,
set aside, alienate and give forever for the general use of the public,
an alley or roadway taken from their respective tracts of land. . .. "9
The third circuit held the property was susceptible to prescription, reasoning that even though the property "was acquired by the plaintiff
for use as a public street, . . . the said property has not been put to
use as a public street since at least 1940, and probably never was."' 0
In 1986, the first circuit decided City of Covington v. Glockner,"
which involved an alley that the court determined was dedicated to the
city even though the plat was recorded before the adoption of the
predecessor to Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 33:5051.12 Since
the case was decided on partial summary judgment, the court had no
evidence of the extent to which the alley had been used over the years
and did not determine whether it had ceased to be used. The court's
analysis did not focus on public use at all, but rather on the fact of
the city's ownership of the property. The court stated, "The property
so dedicated has the status of public property, and as such, cannot be
."13 It cited 'Yiannopoulos' 4 and Anderson
acquired by prescription ..
v. Police Jury of East FelicianaParish,'5 but neither authority addresses
the precise issue involved in Glockner. The opinion distinguishes Romero
on the basis that there "the public property was not dedicated to public
use.' ' 6 The meaning of that statement, however, is unclear. In Romero,
the property had been dedicated to the city in the sense that ownership
had been transferred as a result of the filing of a notarial act accom-

8. 391 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
9. Opinion of the trial judge, p.2; found on p.52 of the appellate court transcript.
Although the forerunner of La. R.S. 33:5051 (1966) was not complied with, the act was
executed as part of a plan to subdivide property into lots and alleys and streets. The act
stated that the grantors executed the document "because each deems it to his advantage,
the said alley or road will enable him to divide or subdivide his remaining holdings into
lots, to which lots entrance may be the more easily and readily had, thus enahncing in
value the said lots, and for other valid reasons." Transcript at p. 45.
10. 391 So. 2d at 549.
11. 486 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 693 (1986).
12. Act 134 of 1896 required subdividers to file a plat containing a "formal dedication
made by the owners of the property or their duly authorized agent of all the streets,
alleys and public squares or plats shown on the map to public use."
13. 486 So. 2d at 842.
14. Yiannopoulos, Common, Public, and Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 La. L. Rev. 697, 737 (1961).
15. 452 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 457 So. 2d 13 (1984).
16. 486 So. 2d at 842.
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panied by a plat of the alley. Perhaps the court uses the term "dedicate"
to mean use by the public or intent that there be use by the public.
But again, Romero also involved intent that there be public use.
Schmit v. St. Bernard Parish Police Jury17 also involved "an unopened, unimproved, but dedicated street owned by the Parish."' s With
little discussion, the fourth circuit simply cited Glockner19 and said the
street "is not susceptible of private ownership. "20
DoctrinalBackground
Civil Code article 450 provides that things "owned by the state or
its political subdivisons in their capacity as public persons" are public
things, whereas article 453 specifies that things owned "by the state or
its political subdivisions in their capacity as private persons" are private
things. 21 The code, however, does not explain the distinction between a
governmental entity's public and private capacity. The drafters' com22
ments do recognize that the distinction is not a clear one even in France,
where some difference results from the division of the French court
system into administrative courts for public law concerns and civil law
23
courts for private law concerns.
The best the code does is to give examples: public things of the
state include "running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore." '24 Noticeably
missing here is a reference to the state's highways. Nonetheless, the
examples given of public things of political subdivisions include "streets
and public squares. ' 25 It would seem to follow that streets that really

17. 504 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
18. Id. at 620.
19. Actually, it referred to the case by the name of another of the defendants, City
of Covington v. David.
20. 504 So. 2d at 621.
21. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 classified all things owned by government units
as public things, but it also distinguished between public things of the public domain and
public things of the private domain. La. Civ, Code arts. 453, 458, 482 (1870). The revision
changed the classification, but not the susceptibility to prescription. Though property of
government units may now be public or private things, the distinction hinges on whether
government owns in a public or private capacity, a distinction similar to that made under
the prior law. La. Civ. Code arts. 450, 453 and the comments thereunder. See A.
Yiannopoulos, supra note 3, §§ 16, 33, and 40.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 450, comment (c).
23. See David, French Law-Its Structure, Sources and Methodology, Part II (trans.
by Kindred, LSU 1972).
24. La. Civ. Code art. 450.
25. Id.
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are such, that is, that are built and/or used, are public things.2 6 The
code, however, leaves open the question as to land designated for
development as a street.
The uncertainty of these code concepts led to the adoption of more
precise rules in the constitution to protect most state owned property.
Protection of the public interest against state alienation of valuable
mineral producing lands led to what is now Art. IX, § 4(B) of the 1974
Constitution: "Lands and mineral interests of the state, of a school
board, or of a levee district shall not be lost by prescription. ' 27 By its
terms, the provision applies to all land, whether a public thing or a
private thing, owned by the state, a school board or a levee district.
The protection does not extend to all government owned land, however.
The provision, during the Constituional Convention of 1973, started
with protection of the state, followed by amendments to protect levee
boards and school boards. 2 No protection for police juries and municipalities and other governmental entities was provided. As to them,
the traditional Civil Code principle still applies.
Municipal corporations obtained some protection by the adoption
of what is now La. R.S. 9:5804, which provides that "alienable immovable property" of municipalities can be made imprescriiptible by the
recordation of a notice to that effect or the recordation of the written
act by which the property was acquired. 29 This protection would of
necessity extend to the private things of government entities, for they
are "alienable" in the sense that they can be transferred to private
individuals. Of course, if the property is inalienable, it would probably
be a public thing nonetheless and thus not subject to prescription by
private persons.
A related development occurred with respect to the enforcement of
judgments against government entities. Traditionally, the Civil Code
principle that public things are insusceptible of private ownership prevented private persons from seizing and selling (to private persons)

26. Based on common dictionary definitions, it would seem that land is not a street
until it is built or used. Webster's New World Dictionary's definition refers to a "paved
road," "a public road in a town or city; especially, a paved thoroughfare with the
sidewalks and buildings along one side or both sides," Also, "such a road apart from
the sidewalks." Webster's New World Dictionary 1442 (College ed. 1960).
27. La. Const. art. XII, § 13 also provides: "Prescription shall not run against the
state in any civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this constitution or expressly by
law."
28. Hargrave, "Statutory" and "Hortatory" Provisions of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 43 La. L. Rev. 647, 663 (1983).
29. Enacted by 1926 La. Acts No. 169. The statute was held not to be retroactive
in Prothro v. City of Natchitoches, 265 So. 2d 242 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
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property that was classified as public.' 0 The modern constitutional approach is more certain: Art. XII, § 10(C) states that "no public property
or public funds shall be subject to seizure." No government owned
things, whether they be classified as public things or private things under
the Civil Code, can be seized. Here, it is clear that the protection is
given to "the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision." Thus,
the traditional Civil Code rule against seizure of public things is no
longer relevant and the question of whether something is owned in a
private or public capacity is no longer important with respect to sei3
zures. '
Another relevant-and old-statute is La. R.S. 33:5051, the mechanism by which most streets became owned by a political subdivision.3"
It requires a subdivider to record a plat of the subdivision and to include
on that plat a dedication of all the streets, alleys and public squares
to public use. Although the statute is not clear on the point, substantial

30. Or, as the scheme of the 1870 code would have indicated: things that were public
things in the public domain of the governmental entity. La. Civ. Code arts. 453, 458,
482 (1870).
31. Presumably, also of less importance are the depression era cases that strained to
broaden the concept of things in the public domain to protect against seizures. See, e.g.,
the cases cited in A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 3, § 34 at 98, n.87.
32. Adopted by 1896 La. Acts No. 134. It now provides:
Whenever the owner of any real estate desires to lay off the same into squares
or lots with streets or alleys between the squares or lots and with the intention
of selling or offering for sale any of the squares or lots, he shall, before selling
any square or lot or any portion of same, cause the real estate to be surveyed
and platted or subdivided by a licensed surveyor or civil engineer into lots or
blocks, or both, each designated by number, and set stakes, which shall be
permanent in nature, at all of the comers of every lot and block thereof,
properly marked so as to designate the correct number of each lot and block;
write the legal description of the land on the plat or map, and cause to be
made and filed in the office of the keeper of notarial records of the parish
wherein the property is situated and copied into the conveyance record book
of such parish, and a duplicate thereof filed with the assessor of the parish a
correct map of the real estate so divided, which map shall contain the following:
(I) The section, township, and range in which such real estate or subdivision
thereof lies according to government survey. (2) The number of squares by
numerals from I up, and the dimensions of each square in feet and inches. (3)
The number of each lot or subdivision of a square and its dimensions in feet
and inches. (4) The name of each street and alley and its length and width in
feet and inches. (5) The name or number of each square or plat dedicated to
public use. (6) A certificate of the parish surveyor or any other licensed surveyor
or civil engineer of this state approving said map and stating that the same is
in accordance with the provisions of this Section and with the laws and ordinances
of the parish in which the property is situated. (7) A formal dedication made
by the owner or owners of the property or their duly authorized agent of all
the streets, alleys and public squares or plats shown on the map to public use.
La. R.S. 33:5051 (1966).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

compliance with its requirements results in the political subdivision obtaining ownership of the land under the streets and squares, and not
just a servitude." The usual view is that mere recordation is sufficient
to transfer title, whether the street is actually developed or not.3 4 More
recently, however, the supreme court held that it is adequate to dedicate
only a servitude if that is clearly the owner's intent. 5
Problems with undeveloped or abandoned streets were also partially
addressed in La. R.S. 48:70136 which provides that upon a public authority abandoning a street, ownership reverts to the then existing contiguous landowners.
The problem at hand-acquisitive prescription of undeveloped streetsis thus a complicated one made more difficult by piecemeal legislation
as well as the failure to specify with precision the property that is to
be considered public and private. When the legislative and constitutional
drafters were made aware of the more serious problems in the area,
they adopted clear legislation that skirted the code's classification scheme.
When other policies perceived as important were involved, as with mineral interests, clear solutions were provided. With city streets, however,
one has to return to the basic code provisions. And here, the code is
not clear. The history of the provisions is not especially helpful. With
the courts of appeal split on the issue, the entire matter is open for
consideration in a flexible analysis that can encompass a number of
policy issues. Some of those issues are discussed below.
Policy Concerns
Public Use
The overriding policy interest in roads and streets is to provide a
systematic and efficient system of transportation. More simply, the interest is in use. Ownership of public things has often been described as
ownership in the special sense of protecting the public's right to use
the thing.37 To the extent that calling a street that is in use a public

33. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
34. Id.
35. Pioneer Prod. Corp. v. Seagraves, 340 So. 2d 270 (La. 1976).
36. Adopted by 1938 La. Acts No. 389.
37. E.g., "Property of the state, then, may be in the nature of public things or in
the nature of private things. Public things are those held 'out of commerce . . . . dedicated
to public use, and held as a public trust, for public uses.' " Todd v. State of Louisiana,
456 So. 2d 1340, 1346 (La. 1983) (quoting City of New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co.,
131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695, 696 (1913)). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board,
317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1974); Save Ourselves Inc. v. Louisiana Envt. Control Comm'n,
452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984). Indeed, La. Civ. Code art. 455 reflects this emphasis on
use. Under it, even private things owned by private persons may be subject to public
use.
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thing helps to preserve the public's continued use, it serves a valid
purpose. However, if it was never developed, and no public use occurred,
the policy interest appears to be virtually non-existent. If a street was
opened, but ceased to be used for traffic for a period sufficient for
prescription to run (10 or 30 years), there would again be little public
demand for use.
The most obvious public thing is the bed of a navigable river.3" The
river is subject to public use, but only so long as it is navigable, that
is, usable. Once a stream becomes non-navigable, it is in the private
domain of the state and under the code's classification scheme, a private
thing.3 9 By analogy, a road or street would remain a public thing as
long as it is used; then it would become a private thing.
Configuration of Land Parcels
The traditional rule is that ownership vests in a municipality upon
recordation of a plat showing streets and squares. One consideration
supporting the rule is that to allow the contrary (and permit dedication
of servitudes) would encourage developers to keep unusable plots of
ground. The long, narrow, interconnecting parcels that would be under
the streets would make difficult the recombination of subdivision lots
into economically developable plots. Also, upon prescription for nonuse,
such long, narrow plots would hinder access to other parcels. These
concerns, however, do not seem that important when the issue is prescription of the streets by neighboring landowners. In the recent cases,
it was the adjacent landowners who were using the land and claiming
prescription. To allow the prescription here would not be contrary to
the basic policy but would encourage it by enlarging the lots and
terminating governmental title to the narrow parcels.
Title Examination Simplicity
It may be that one reason for the adoption of the view that merely
filing a plat vests ownership of streets in the public was to provide a
certain result for title examiners. 4 0 They could conclude that ownership
was vested on the basis of public records, without physically examining
the property to determine whether a street existed or not. However, the
recent developments in the supreme court allowing dedication of servitudes instead of full ownership indicate that this concern can be met
without providing title in the government entity. 4' Furthermore, while

38. La. Civ. Code art. 450.
39. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 3, § 46 at 132.
40. Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson, 226 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
41. Pioneer Prod. Corp. v, Seagraves, 340 So. 2d 270 (La. 1976). Justice Dixon,
who dissented in Seagraves, wrote the opinion for the second circuit in Wilson.
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it is true that the possibility of prescription forces the title examiner to
look beyond the records and to the facts of possession, this is simply
the same risk that arises as to the lots fronting on the street. Since the
usual case will involve whether the street goes with the lot, 42 it is no
greater inconvenience for the title examiner to have to inspect the street
as well as the adjoining lot.
Public Finance
Though in a few instances the mineral proceeds allocated to streets
may be important, 43 that concern has not been a strong driving force
in the statutes. The constitutional provision adopted to keep mineral
production in the state's hands specifically does not include municipalities." That such was not an oversight is illustrated by the fact that in
the related provisions dealing with enforcement of judgments, the municipalities and parishes are protected. 45 The statutory provisions allowing
municipalities to revoke the dedication of streets and return them to
private ownership also reflect an unconcern for fiscal matters, in preference to private rights.4" If a city wants to protect its fiscal matters in
some instances, it can do so by recording the notice as provided in La. R.S.
9:5804.
Public Authority Concerns
Some might argue that a rule keeping streets from being prescribed
enhances the administrative powers of local government. To transfer
ownership to the private sector, an official decision by the police jury
or city council would be necessary. Others might argue, on the other
hand, that transfers of ownership without government action enhances
individual freedom and should be encouraged. The interest in coordinated
government policy can be balanced here against the concern with possible
corruption or pressure group manipulation.
Conclusion
While the outcome of these considerations is not free from doubt,
it appears that the detriment to the interests of municipalities by allowing

42. In the four cases discussed, it was adjacent landowners who claimed the alley
or street.
43. The case names make the point: Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil
Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938); Pioneer Prod. Corp. v. Seagraves, 340 So.
2d 270 (La. 1976); Garrett v. Pioneer Prod. Corp., 290 So. 2d 851 (La. 1980); Chevron
Oil Co. v. Wilson, 226 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
44. La. Const. art. IX, § 4.
45. La. Const. art. XII, § 10(c).
46. La. R.S. 48:701 (1984) and related statutes.
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prescription to occur is not great. If there is some potential for great
loss, the municipality has a statutory mechapism to protect its interests
by recording a simple document. 47 On the other hand, the interest on
the part of the long-term possessor is an important one which underlies
all of acquisitive prescription-legal stability. The institution of prescription is structured, also, so that the possessor will acquire only by
publicly possessing, and thus there is an element of neglect or fault on
the part of an owner who is not attending to his interests. "At any
rate, even if prescription seems to lead in some rare cases to results
contrary to equity .. . it can easily be forgiven in exchange for the
great services it renders to society. Without it there would be no security
in transactions, no stability in private estates, no peace among individ48
uals, no order in the state."
POSSESSION As OWNER

Caruthers v. Caruthers49 involved the use of a possessory action in
an unusual context-as part of the litigation incident to a divorce and
partition of community property. One seldom sees a possessory action
that is consolidated with a rule for child custody and support. At issue
was Sam's Place, a tract of land on which were constructed a bar,
living quarters, docks and sheds. The former wife filed a possessory
action after the court determined that the property was a separate asset
of the husband, and he sought to evict her.
The married couple physically occupied the property during their
marriage. In 1978, when the separation and divorce litigation started,
they stipulated that the wife would "have the use, occupancy and right
to work the premises, and the revenues derived therefrom in lieu of
alimony and support." ' 50 The court of appeal concluded the wife did
not meet the requirement of possessing as owner both before and after
the execution of the stipulation.
The court order incorporating the stipulation granted the right to
physically occupy the property, but it "did not, however, put her in
possession as owner."'" The same conclusion would follow if, instead
of a stipulation, there would be a court order under La. R.S. 9:308
allocating the "family residence" to one or the other spouse. Such an
allocation can occur regardless of whether the property is separate or

47. La. R.S. 9:5804 (1983).
48. G. Baudry-Lacantinerie & A. Tessier, 28 Traite Theorique et pratique de Droit
Civil, Chapt. II, § 2 (4th ed. updated) in J. Mayda, 5 Civil Law Translations 18 (1972).
49. 484 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 1stCir. 1986).
50. Id. at 751.
51. Id.at 752.
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community and thus is no indication of ownership.12 Indeed, in any

dispute over ownership, a temporary agreement for occupancy of the
premises pending litigation should not change the parties' rights. Such
compromises pending litigation ought to be encouraged. More important

than such an order or stipulation is whether one claims to be owner
of the property or not. 3 A stipulation or a court order would not
establish possession as owner, nor would it defeat one's claim to be
possessing as owner if that were the situation before the order was
issued or the stipulation entered.
The court in Caruthers discussed in passing whether the wife pos-

sessed as owner before the marital difficulties arose. It simply said:
As determined by the judgment of March 2, 1981, this property
was not the community property of plaintiff and defendant, but
rather was the separate property of defendant. At this point

plaintiff was not possessing as owner but rather living with her
4
husband on property owned by him.1

The court's conclusion as to possession does not necessarily follow from
the determination that the property was the husband's separate asset.
The essence of possessing as owner is not whether one owns, but how

one acts to indicate that one has ownership or not.5

The wife, for

52. In allocating the family residence, the court "shall inquire into the relative
economic status of the spouses, including both community and separate property, and the
needs of the children, if any, and shall award the use and occupancy of the family
residence and the use of any community movables or immovables to the spouse in
accordance with the best interest of the family." La. R.S. 9:308(A). The statute does not
direct the court to consider whether the family residence is separate or community property
in making the allocation.
53. La. Civ. Code art. 3424 requires that to acquire possession, "one must intend
to possess as owner" in addition to taking corporeal possession. The converse is to be
a precarious possessor, which article 3437 specifies as one who exercises physical possession
"with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or possessor." Planiol explains that
"[tlhe possession must be enjoyed 'under the title of owner.' What the law means by
this is that the possession must not be precarious." 1 M. Planiol, Treatise on The Civil
Law Pt. 2, No. 2276 at 347 (12th ed. 1939 La. St. L. Inst. Trans.).
54. 484 So. 2d at 752.
55. It is clear that the intent to possess as owner has to do with the subjective
intent of one who professes to possess and does not mean that the possessor
must pretend to have valid title rights. The possessor may actually have title,
but in the possessory action that factor is signficant only in determining intent.
The intent may exist without title to the knowledge of the possessor, for as
shown above, even our codes permit a person in bad faith or a usurper to
maintain the possessory action. Inasmuch as the corporeal possession required
as a predicate to a possessory action is the same as that required for acquisitive
prescription of 30 years, the corporeal possession must be open and notorious
and adverse or hostile to the true owner and everyone else.
Harper v. Willis, 383 So. 2d 1299, 1307 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
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example, may have believed the property was community and held herself
out to the world as a co-owner. If so, she meets the requirements of
possessing as an owner, or, more particularly, as a co-owner. In the
instant case, the facts are not clear as to how the wife possessed during
the marriage, so the result may be supported by other facts.
In any event, there is more to be said about the relationship between
the concept of possession of property, be it community or separate,
physically occupied or controlled by both spouses during marriage. The
problem is more complex since the adoption of the equal management
regime under which the wife has the same rights as the husband with
respect to acquiring, managing and alienating community property. Both
6
spouses can now perform the kinds of acts owners normally exercise.
However, as the following discussion indicates, the issues of possession
and of possessory actions as between spouses ought not be significant
ones. More relevant is Civil Code article 2340 which specifies that any
property possessed by a spouse during a community regime is presumed
to be community. That specific provision would seem to supercede the
7
role of possession in providing a presumption of ownership.1
To the extent that a possessory action protects a right to continued
possession unless the defendant can prove ownership. 8 it would normally
be unimportant in the marital context. In Caruthers, even if the wife
had prevailed on the possession issue, all the husband had to do to
regain possession was to show his judgment recently issued by the same
court decreeing that the property was his. Indeed, in virtually any case
involving a claim that an asset is community, the common author rule
would relieve the non-possessor of proving a title back to a sovereign. 9

56. La. Civ. Code art. 2346.
57. The general rule applicable to all possessors is stated in La. Civ. Code art. 3423:
"A possessor is considered provisionally as owner of the thing he possesses until the right
of the true owner is established." However, article 2340 states that things "in the possession
of a spouse during the existence of a regime of community of acquets and gains are
presumed to be community, but either spouse may prove that they are separate property."
The two articles can be reconciled by applying the general presumption in litigation with
third persons (where the possessor is presumed to be owner) and the specific presumption
between the spouses.
58. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3662(1) provides that a judgment to a successful plaintiff
in a possessory action shall "[rlecognize his right to the possession of the immovable
property or real right therein, and restore him to possession thereof if he has been evicted,
or maintain him in possession thereof if the disturbance has not been an eviction."
59. The non-possessing spouse asserting that an asset is community is asserting a
type of co-ownership of the property. The co-ownership would result by operation of law
upon one or the other spouse acquiring the asset. The non-acquiring spouse then is
obtaining rights from the same source, or prior owner, as the acquiring spouse. In such
a case, La. Civ-. Code art. 532 states that "[wlhen the titles of the parties are traced to
a common author, he is presumed to be the previous owner." The non-possessing spouse

468
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The other main effect of possession relates to 10 and 30 year
acquisitive prescription, and here the question of possession between coowners in community might be more important.
When co-owners not married to each other exercise acts of possession, co-possession can exist. 0 Each person possesses as owner an undivided part of the property. As to third persons, they are both possessors.
Each could bring a possessory action against a third person asserting
rights as to the undivided half each purports to own. Third persons
claiming to possess or to own the property could bring an action against
either or both of the claiming co-possessors. Failure to join both of
them, of course, would be inadvisable, for the person not a party would
not be bound by the judgment. As between themselves, the co-possessors
are governed by the substantive rule that each is entitled to possess all
the property; a court will not then attempt to regulate their rights to
occupy; the remedy for their lack of agreement on management is a
61
partition.
If a spouse owns separate property that is physically occupied or
controlled by both spouses, as is not unusual in the case of a family
residence, an initial issue will be the non-owning spouse's intentions. If
that spouse does not purport to own, but admits to occupying the
property by virtue of another's rights, he is a precarious possessor. He
is not a true possessor and would have no claim to acquisitive prescription
rights or to win a possessory action against the spouse or any other
person. On the other hand, if the non-owning spouse claims to own all
the property (as after an invalid donation is executed), and the real
owner has no such pretentions, the non-owner meets the requirements
of possession. If the spouse who admitted the property was the other's
separate asset wants to change from precarious to true possession, paragraph two of article 3439, applies; he "commences to possess for himself
when he gives actual notice of this intent to the person on whose behalf
he is possessing."

is then relieved of proving prior titles and thus can concentrate on proving the time and
nature of the acquisition by the other spouse. Here, he benefits from article 2340, and
the property is presumed to be community. See Hargrave, Presumptions and Burdens of
Proof in Louisiana Property Law, 46 La. L. Rev. 225 (1985).
60. Though co-possession is not addressed directly, its existence is assumed in the
provisions of article 3439 which state that a "co-owner, or his universal successor,
commences to possess for himself when he demonstrates this intent by overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner." See also La. Civ. Code art.
3478.
61. Juneau v. Laborde, 228 La. 410, 82 So. 2d 693 (1955): McVay v. McVay, 318
So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Leblanc v. Scurto, 173 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1965); Butler v. Hensley, 332 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); 2 C. Aubry &
C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 221 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) in J. Mayda, 2 Civil Law
Translations 387 (1966).
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If the property is purportedly held as community, the spouses are
each purportedly owners of an undivided one-half of the property. They
are holding themselves out as co-possessors. Under the Code of Civil
Procedure, in such a case, either spouse appears to have the right to
bring a possessory action against a third person since either spouse is
a proper party to assert a "community right." '62 Presumably, the right
to possess property thought to be community is a community right. In
such a case, the result appears to be different than in the simple coownership situation, where one can assert only one's rights. Here, one
asserts the other spouse's rights, as well. At least, that appears to be
the theory of the procedural provisions. In some instances, that theory
can cause due process problems because of a lack of notice to the other
spouse. If, for example, the court determines that the plaintiff loses the
63
action, it would raise problems as to binding the nonpresent spouse.
Also, the theory of the procedural articles appears to be that a third
person suing to assert possession of the property could sue only one
spouse, for the code of procedure provides that either spouse is the
proper party defendant in such an action dealing with "an action to
enforce an obligation against community property.'' 64 However, here
again, due process demands of notice to both spouses would seem to
65
be required to obtain a binding judgment.
If the spouses have been possessing .the property believing it is
community, and are thus co-possessors as just argued, the next possible
permutation would relate to the ability of one of the spouses to become
sole possessor. In such a case, abandonment by one spouse of one's
pretensions to ownership would result in a loss of possession under
article 3434. The remaining spouse would then possess as owner of all.
Also, under article 3439, one co-owner could commence to "possess for
himself when he demonstrates this intent by overt and unambiguous
acts sufficient to give notice to his co-owner."
CONSTRUCTIVE

POSSESSION

OF ALLUVION

In Riverlands Fleeting Corp. v. Ashland Plantation,6 the court
concluded that possession of a described tract of land "extends by
operation of law to include . .batture or alluvian [sic] in the absence
.

62. La. Code Civ. P. art. 686.
63. See Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 568 (La. 1987); Hargrave, Developments in the
Law, 1985-1986-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 47 La. L. Rev, 333 (1986).
64. La. Code Civ. P. art. 736.
65. See supra note 63.
66. 498 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986). Alluvion, the common legal term, is
synonymous with alluvium, a more scientific variant of the word. Both refer to an increase
in land deposited by flowing water.
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of actual physical adverse possession of the batture by someone else. ' 67
That conclusion is probably unavoidable even though a technical construction of article 3426 might suggest a contrary result. Article 3426
establishes the concept of constructive possession with the provision that
one's possession of part of an immovable "by virtue of a title" extends
"within the limits of his title. ' 6s The term "limits" could be construed
as referring to a property description in a juridical act and no more;
if so, alluvion not within that described space would not be constructively
possessed. That word analysis, however, poses several theoretical and
practical problems.
"Title" means more than an act of sale or a description. The term
refers to the source of one's ownership of the property.6 9 It has a
qualitative aspect as well as a geographic one. For example, one's title
includes all the rights normally associated with full ownership unless
the act of acquisition excludes some of those rights. Even a squatter
possessing the surface is constructively possessing all the rights in minerals
that are not being physically possessed by another. 70 One's title to a
riparian tract also includes ownership of the land underneath a nonnavigable stream even if the property description does not so state. 7' A
riparian landowner acquires ownership of alluvion that attaches to the
property even if nothing is said about future alluvion in the act of
acquisition. 72 These examples illustrate a general principle that ownership
or possession of a principal thing extends to ownership or possession

67. Id.at 41.
68. The predecessor provision, article 3437 of the Code of 1870 stated more generally
that if one occupied a part, it was constructive possession "of all that is included within
the boundaries." That reference could have been to actual boundary markers beyond the
legal description.
69. ". . . the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure declares that the plaintiff in the
petitory action, in order to recover, 'must make out his title.' The word 'title' in this
article means ownership. A plaintiff in a petitory action thus makes out his title when
he proves his ownership of the immovable. Ownership of immovable property may be
acquired by an unbroken chain of transfers from a previous owner or by acquisitive
prescription." Comment (b) to La. Civ. Code art. 531.
Title "is a generic term which embraces any juridical act. Moreover, the servitude may
be established by all acts by which immovable property can be transferred." McGuffy
v. Weil, 240 La. 758, 125 So. 2d 154 (1960).
70. La. R.S. 31:155.
71. La. Civ. Code art. 506. See the suggestion in Chaney v. State Mineral Board,
444 So. 2d 105 (La. 1983) that such constructive possession might exist. In that case,
however, "No evidence other than these allegations of titles was introduced; the record
is devoid of the titles or deeds of riparian owners. Nor do the plaintiffs suggest that
because they hold title to the riparian land and because they possess portions of the bank
and parts of the bed that they possess the whole to the middle of the riverbed." Id. at
109.
72. La. Civ. Code art. 499.
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of its accessories. Alluvion is a prime example of an accessory to a
tract of land. 73 In light of these concepts, it is not inconsistent to
conclude that article 3426 includes constructive possession of alluvion
attached to a described riparian tract. That accessory right is part of
one's "title."
The opposite rule would cause serious problems. One result would
be that the alluvion would not be possessed at all, but the contiguous
main tract would be. Title litigation would be made more difficult
without the presumption that the possessor owns the property. The
presumption of ownership would go to the described main tract only.
If a plaintiff could prove a "better title" to the main parcel and the
alluvion, but not a "good title" as required to be proved against a
possessor, the plaintiff would lose as to the main tract but would win
as to the alluvion. The main tract would lose access to the stream. This
would be inconsistent with the basic alluvion and dereliction policies
which show a high concern with riparian landowners keeping their water
access, both for transportation and for use of the water. Also, separate,
small, narrow tracts along streams would not normally be the best
method for encouraging development of land. Similarily, if the possessor
of the main tract would establish ownership by prescription, it would
be anomalous not to include its accessory, the alluvion.
The related boundary action is an appropriate analog. If one possesses beyond one's described tract to a visible boundary, one can acquire
the excess even without.title. In the alluvion situation, a stream bank
would seem to qualify as a visible boundary, for past cases have held
that a watercourse is considered a visible bound, and one would be
acquiring the excess by prescription. This, in effect, treats the land
beyond the description as being possessed.
SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS

ON BUILDING RESTRICTIONS

Reflecting general freedom of contract principles, the Civil Code
limits on the substantive content of building restrictions are minimal.
Article 778 does require affirmative duties, if imposed, to be "reasonable
and necessary for the maintenance of the general plan." Otherwise, the
general rules apply: under Civil Code article 7, "persons may not by
their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the
public interest," and, under article 2030, a contract that "violates a
rule of public order" is null.
Basic public policies often invoked in this area are those of keeping
property in commerce and encouraging simplicity of title. The leading
case of Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux 74 concluded that racially

73.
74.

La. Civ. Code arts. 559, 563.
136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
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restrictive covenants were not in violation of that principle. While restrictions of total and perpetual inalienabilty would not be allowed,
"partial and temporary ' 75 inalienability would. What results is an inquiry, only partly factual, that assesses the extent to which a restriction
would make the property less salable and transferable. 76 Several recent
cases have pursued this analysis.
Architectural Control Committees
A common restriction in modern subdivisions requires a landowner
to obtain approval of plans and specifications from a committee "as
to the harmony of external design and location in relation to surrounding
'77
structures and topography.
The third and fourth circuits adopted a per se rule that the restrictions were invalid. 7 Because of the vagueness of such standards, the
resulting uncontrolled discretion "cannot be squared with Louisiana's
policy of favoring the free and unrestrained use of immovable property." '79 Under this approach, it was not necessary to examine the facts
in a particular case to see if the committee acted reasonably. The first
and second circuits, on the other hand, concluded that such restrictions
were valid, but that the court would judge the reasonableness of the
committee's actions in particular cases.80
More recently, the first circuit retreated from its approach and
concluded in Oakbrook Civic Association v. Sonnier that the clause was
invalid because it was "so general that a landowner is not fairly apprised
of uses that can be made. . . ."8 The supreme court granted writs and
reversed. It upheld the restriction saying:
The majority of the states that have considered the issue have
held that covenants requiring submission of plans and consent
before construction are valid . . . so long as the authority to
consent is exercised reasonably and in good faith .82

75. Id. at 643.
76. Under the Civil Code revision, the basic policy is continued and reflected in
article 780 which provides for termination of restrictions within a relatively short period
of years.
77. The language is from the restrictions in Oakbrook Civic Ass'n v. Sonnier, 481
So. 2d 1008, 1011 (La. 1986).
78. Lake Forest, Inc. v. Drury, 352 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Community
Builders Inc. v. Scarborough, 149 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
79. Lake Forest, Inc. v. Drury, 352 So. 2d 305, 307 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
80. 4626 Corp. v. Merriam, 329 So. 2d 885 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Jackson Square
Town House Homes Ass'n v. Mims, 393 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
1 81. Oakbrook Civic Ass'n. v. Sonnier, 470 So. 2d 997 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985),
remanded, 481 So. 2d 1008 (1986).
82. 481 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (La. 1986).
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The court then remanded for a determination of whether the committee
exercised its discretion reasonably.
In the future, reasonable exercise of authority will be the question
in any case, without the use of a per se rule. Little guidance is provided
in the statutes on that question. However, since the source of the rule
is the policy of keeping property in commerce, it would seem that the
focus in a given case would be the extent to which a particular decision
or rule of the committee intrudes on that policy. Also, since court
enforcement of committee action that denies due process or equal protection is prohibited,"3 it should not enforce committee decisions that
have such an effect.
In Jackson Square Town Homes Association v. Mims, the court
found unreasonable the committee's decision to "disapprove all applications for additional storage buildings. 8 4 The court reasoned that the
committee had no power to legislate generally, but only to judge in5
dividual cases based on the facts involved. In 4626 Corp. v. Merriam,"
the court concluded a committee acted reasonably in prohibiting a sign
higher than the roofline of a building in a commercial development;
other signs in the development had been kept below the roof line and
this, was the only sign higher than the adjacent building.
First Refusal Clauses
Becoming more common are restrictions that incorporate first refusal
clauses, clauses requiring a seller to give other owners or an association
the right to purchase -the property on the same terms a willing buyer
has offered. A growing list of court decisions, although not in subdivision
contexts, suggests that such provisions are generally allowed. The supreme court in Price v. Town of Ruston86 enforced such a contract
between co-owners of a building. The first circuit enforced such a clause
in a sale of property in Travis v. Felker.87 The third circuit, in Terrell
v. Messenger,88 upheld such a clause in a sale by a grandmother of a
72 acre tract to her children and grandchildren. In that case, Judge
Laborde reasoned that since the individual desiring to sell would have
been able to do so if one of the co-vendees did not choose to buy, the
clause "does not even result in a partial or temporary inalienability."8 9
Most recently, the fourth circuit in dictum seemed to approve of
such clauses in an office condominium context in Prytania Medical

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See
393
329
171
482
428
Id.

infra text accompanying note 91.
So. 2d 816, 818 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
So. 2d 885 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
La. 985, 132 So. 653 (1931).
So. 2d 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
So. 2d 1241 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
at 1245.
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Complex Owners Association v. Mary. 90 There, the owners association
sought to enjoin a transfer by Dr. Mary while the association sought
from him "all correspondence and documentation" related to the sale.
It appears that some dispute existed as to whether the offer of one
million dollars cash also included payment for some equipment and
furnishings. The court of appeal affirmed the lower court denial of
injunctive relief. Dr. Mary had complied with the condominium agreement that the notice of proposed Sale include name, address, financial
and character references of the proposed purchaser and the terms of
the sale.
Federal Influences.
Ever since Shelley v. Kramer,91 court action to enforce private restrictive covenants is considered state action for fourteenth amendment
purposes; thus courts cannot enforce restrictions that would result in
denials of due process or equal protection. Using that approach, the
third circuit in Roy v. Ducote,92 found wanting a restriction that prohibited the construction of homes subsidized by federal programs for
low income citizens. 93 Invoking equal protection, the court concluded
there was no interest "so compelling as to justify invidious discrimination
against persons of low income." '94 That conclusion probably would not
withstand federal court scrutiny; 9 however, a similar conclusion could
96
be reached on state public policy or state constitutional grounds.
More recently, the supreme court in Cashio v. Shoriak, 97 considered

a restriction against any yard signs. The provision was attacked on the
basis that enforcement, especially as to political signs, would violate
free speech rights. In the court of appeal, Judge Shortess dissented on
those grounds. 9 The supreme court decided the case on narrower grounds
and construed the restriction to allow small political signs. In that

90. 506 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
91. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948).
92. 399 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
93. The restriction provided: "No dwelling shall be constructed which is financed by
a Farmers' Housing Administration interest credit loan, or by the Federal Housing Authority 235 "I" of "HUD" programs. This legislation shall not apply to other loan
programs for such dwellings administered by the above mentioned agencies." 399 So. 2d
at 738.
94. Id.at 741.
95. E.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 91 S. Ct. 1331 (1971); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
96. La. Const. art. I, § 3 of the Const. of 1974 contains a general equal protection
clause.
97. 481 So. 2d 1013 (La. 1986).
98. Cashio v. Shoriak, 472 So. 2d 264, 267 (La.App. 1stCir. 1985), rev'd, 481 So.
2d 1013 (1986).
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analysis, however, the court was influenced by the constitutional problems that might otherwise arise and chose to construe the restriction to
avoid the constitutional conflict.

